Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:

login

Log in through your institution.

If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Journal Article

Scoring Rules and the Inevitability of Probability

Dennis V. Lindley
International Statistical Review / Revue Internationale de Statistique
Vol. 50, No. 1 (Apr., 1982), pp. 1-11
DOI: 10.2307/1402448
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1402448
Page Count: 11
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Download ($12.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Add to My Lists
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Scoring Rules and the Inevitability of Probability
Preview not available

Abstract

Let a person express his uncertainty about an event E, conditional upon an event F, by a number x and let him be given, as a result, a score which depends on x and the truth or falsity of E when F is true. It is shown that if the scores are additive for different events and if the person chooses admissible values only, then there exists a known transform of the values x to values which are probabilities. In particular, it follows that values x derived by significance tests, confidence intervals or by the rules of fuzzy logic are inadmissible. Only probability is a sensible description of uncertainty. /// Supposons qu'une personne exprime son incertitude à l'égard d'un événement E, qui est conditionné à un événement F, par un nombre x, et supposons qu'on lui assigne, comme résultat, un nombre s qui dépend de x et de la vérité ou de la fausseté de E quand F est vrai. On démontre que si les nombres s sont additives pour des événements différents, et que si la personne ne choisit que des valeurs admissibles, alors il existe une transformation connue des valeurs x aux valeurs qui sont des probabilités. En particulier, il en résulte que des valeurs x dérivées des tests de signification, des intervalles de confiance ou des règles de 'fuzzy logic' sont inadmissibles. Seule la probabilité est une description raisonnable de l'incertitude.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[1]
    [1]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
2
    2
  • Thumbnail: Page 
3
    3
  • Thumbnail: Page 
4
    4
  • Thumbnail: Page 
5
    5
  • Thumbnail: Page 
6
    6
  • Thumbnail: Page 
7
    7
  • Thumbnail: Page 
8
    8
  • Thumbnail: Page 
9
    9
  • Thumbnail: Page 
10
    10
  • Thumbnail: Page 
11
    11