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The Effects of Pay Incentives on Teacher Absenteeism

Stephen L. Jacobson
The Journal of Human Resources
Vol. 24, No. 2 (Spring, 1989), pp. 280-286
DOI: 10.2307/145856
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/145856
Page Count: 7
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The Effects of Pay Incentives on Teacher Absenteeism
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Abstract

This study examines the effects of pay incentives on teacher absence in one New York district. Paired sample t-tests of 292 teachers revealed that teacher absence declined significantly and perfect attendance rose from 8 percent to 34 percent during the first year of an attendance incentive plan. The study also revealed that the significant reduction in sick leave was accompanied by a significant increase in the use of personal days. The implications of these findings for practice and future research are discussed.

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