You are not currently logged in.
Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:
If You Use a Screen ReaderThis content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
The Effects of Pay Incentives on Teacher Absenteeism
Stephen L. Jacobson
The Journal of Human Resources
Vol. 24, No. 2 (Spring, 1989), pp. 280-286
Published by: University of Wisconsin Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/145856
Page Count: 7
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Preview not available
This study examines the effects of pay incentives on teacher absence in one New York district. Paired sample t-tests of 292 teachers revealed that teacher absence declined significantly and perfect attendance rose from 8 percent to 34 percent during the first year of an attendance incentive plan. The study also revealed that the significant reduction in sick leave was accompanied by a significant increase in the use of personal days. The implications of these findings for practice and future research are discussed.
The Journal of Human Resources © 1989 Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System