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The Appointments Dilemma
American Journal of Political Science
Vol. 48, No. 3 (Jul., 2004), pp. 413-428
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1519907
Page Count: 16
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In a separation of powers political system, effective bureaucratic control may be undermined by the fact that the power to appoint bureaucrats is controlled by a different set of principals from those that may control them through statutory or budgetary means. In particular, executives have proposal power over bureaucratic appointments and removals while legislators have proposal power over laws. In this article, I explore the consequences of this division of authority for bureaucratic outcomes. I argue that this pattern of authority often produces outcomes inferior to those generated when appointment, removal, and legislative powers are centralized as is the case in many parliamentary systems. The model reveals that restricting executive removal power can mitigate these problems. Finally, I discuss the relevance of this appointments dilemma for bargaining over bureaucratic structures with a focus on removal powers, independent commissions, and civil service rules.
American Journal of Political Science © 2004 Midwest Political Science Association