Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support

On the Cognitive Functioning of Aesthetic Emotions

Roger Pouivet
Leonardo
Vol. 33, No. 1 (2000), pp. 49-53
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1576761
Page Count: 5
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Download ($19.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support
On the Cognitive Functioning of Aesthetic Emotions
Preview not available

Abstract

This article seeks to show that we cannot accept an opposition between aesthetics and logic on the basis of the distinction between aesthetic emotion and cognition. This false distinction is founded on another ill-founded one between private states of mind and public languages. Echoing works by R. de Sousa, we can talk about the rationality of emotions. Following N. Goodman and I. Scheffler, we are conducted to the notion of cognitive emotions. If there are aesthetic emotions, they are likely cognitive. The notion of supervenience seems very adequate to show how aesthetic emotion, even aesthetic pleasure, can be related to cognitive experience.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
49
    49
  • Thumbnail: Page 
50
    50
  • Thumbnail: Page 
51
    51
  • Thumbnail: Page 
52
    52
  • Thumbnail: Page 
53
    53