You are not currently logged in.
Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:
If You Use a Screen ReaderThis content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
On the Cognitive Functioning of Aesthetic Emotions
Vol. 33, No. 1 (2000), pp. 49-53
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1576761
Page Count: 5
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Preview not available
This article seeks to show that we cannot accept an opposition between aesthetics and logic on the basis of the distinction between aesthetic emotion and cognition. This false distinction is founded on another ill-founded one between private states of mind and public languages. Echoing works by R. de Sousa, we can talk about the rationality of emotions. Following N. Goodman and I. Scheffler, we are conducted to the notion of cognitive emotions. If there are aesthetic emotions, they are likely cognitive. The notion of supervenience seems very adequate to show how aesthetic emotion, even aesthetic pleasure, can be related to cognitive experience.
Leonardo © 2000 Leonardo