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The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman
New Series, Vol. 211, No. 4481 (Jan. 30, 1981), pp. 453-458
Published by: American Association for the Advancement of Science
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1685855
Page Count: 6
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Health outcomes, Rational choice theory, Disease risk, Risk aversion, Psychological assessment, Prices, Prospect theory, Expected utility, Betting, Risk aversion preference
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The psychological principles that govern the perception of decision problems and the evaluation of probabilities and outcomes produce predictable shifts of preference when the same problem is framed in different ways. Reversals of preference are demonstrated in choices regarding monetary outcomes, both hypothetical and real, and in questions pertaining to the loss of human lives. The effects of frames on preferences are compared to the effects of perspectives on perceptual appearance. The dependence of preferences on the formulation of decision problems is a significant concern for the theory of rational choice.
Science © 1981 American Association for the Advancement of Science