You are not currently logged in.
Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:
The Evolution of Cooperation
Robert Axelrod and William D. Hamilton
New Series, Vol. 211, No. 4489 (Mar. 27, 1981), pp. 1390-1396
Published by: American Association for the Advancement of Science
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1685895
Page Count: 7
Preview not available
Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficuilty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease.
Science © 1981 American Association for the Advancement of Science