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An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators

David E. Bloom and Christopher L. Cavanagh
The American Economic Review
Vol. 76, No. 3 (Jun., 1986), pp. 408-422
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1813359
Page Count: 15
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An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators
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Abstract

This paper analyzes data on union and employer rankings of different panels of arbitrators in an actual arbitration system. A random utility model of bargainer preferences is developed and estimated. The estimates indicate that unions and employers have similar preferences: in favor of lawyers, more experienced arbitrators, and arbitrators who seem to have previously favored their side. Tests of whether bargainers rank arbitrators strategically reveal no evidence of such behavior.

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