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An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators
David E. Bloom and Christopher L. Cavanagh
The American Economic Review
Vol. 76, No. 3 (Jun., 1986), pp. 408-422
Published by: American Economic Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1813359
Page Count: 15
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Arbitration, Employment, Coefficients, Strategic behavior, Statistical estimation, Economic models, Expected utility, Economic modeling, Economic efficiency, Utility models
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This paper analyzes data on union and employer rankings of different panels of arbitrators in an actual arbitration system. A random utility model of bargainer preferences is developed and estimated. The estimates indicate that unions and employers have similar preferences: in favor of lawyers, more experienced arbitrators, and arbitrators who seem to have previously favored their side. Tests of whether bargainers rank arbitrators strategically reveal no evidence of such behavior.
The American Economic Review © 1986 American Economic Association