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The Economic Theory of Regulation and Public Financing of Presidential Elections
Burton A. Abrams and Russell F. Settle
Journal of Political Economy
Vol. 86, No. 2, Part 1 (Apr., 1978), pp. 245-257
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1830063
Page Count: 13
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Recent changes in campaign finance legislation (passed by a heavily Democratic Congress) are considered within the context of the two competing theories of regulation, the "public-interest" theory and the economic theory of regulation. Empirical evidence is presented in support of the economic theory's explanation for these major regulatory changes in the political process. The evidence suggests that these changes were highly beneficial to the Democratic party and that they were instrumental in Jimmy Carter's defeat of Gerald Ford in the 1976 presidential election.
Journal of Political Economy © 1978 The University of Chicago Press