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The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation

Sam Peltzman
Journal of Political Economy
Vol. 83, No. 4 (Aug., 1975), pp. 677-726
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1830396
Page Count: 49
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The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation
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Abstract

Technological studies imply that annual highway deaths would be 20 percent greater without legally mandated installation of various safety devices on automobiles. However, this literature ignores offsetting effects of nonregulatory demand for safety and driver response to the devices. This article indicates that these offsets are virtually complete, so that regulation has not decreased highway deaths. Time-series (but not cross-section) data imply some saving of auto occupants' lives at the expense of more pedestrian deaths and more nonfatal accidents, a pattern consistent with optimal driver response to regulation.

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