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Strategic Considerations in the Richardson Model of Arms Races
Michael D. Intriligator
Journal of Political Economy
Vol. 83, No. 2 (Apr., 1975), pp. 339-354
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1830926
Page Count: 16
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Missiles, War, Arms races, Simulations, Arms control, Countries, Dynamic modeling, Political economy, Disarmament, Coefficients
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Parameters defining Richardson-type reaction functions for missile stocks are derived, for both deterrers and attackers, as explicit functions of certain underlying technical and timing factors in a simulated missile war. With two deterrers there generally exists a stable equilibrium of mutual assured destruction, where the equilibrium missile stocks depend on technical and timing factors; with two attackers an unstable equilibrium generally exists; and with a deterrer and an attacker no equilibrium exists. Above the stable equilibrium there exists a cone of mutual deterrence, while below it there exist regions of war initiation. Arms control and disarmament measures are treated using this framework.
Journal of Political Economy © 1975 The University of Chicago Press