You are not currently logged in.
Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:
If You Use a Screen ReaderThis content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
An Economic Theory of Self-Control
Richard H. Thaler and H. M. Shefrin
Journal of Political Economy
Vol. 89, No. 2 (Apr., 1981), pp. 392-406
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1833317
Page Count: 15
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Preview not available
The concept of self-control is incorporated in a theory of individual intertemporal choice by modeling the individual as an organization. The individual at a point in time is assumed to be both a farsighted planner and a myopic doer. The resulting conflict is seen to be fundamentally similar to the agency conflict between the owners and managers of a firm. Both individuals and firms use the same techniques to mitigate the problems which the conflicts create. This paper stresses the implications of this agency model and discusses as applications the effect of pensions on saving, saving and the timing of income flows, and individual discount rates.
Journal of Political Economy © 1981 The University of Chicago Press