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Theories, Frameworks, and Ontology
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 29, No. 2 (Apr., 1962), pp. 132-138
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/186540
Page Count: 7
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Utilizing Carnap's notions of "questions [or assertions] within a framework" and "questions [or assertions] about a framework" and his account of A-truth (analyticity in the broad sense), a theory of the ontological status of entities--in particular, that of theoretical entities--is adumbrated. In addition to the usual L-rules, each conceptual framework considered embodies a set of sentences whose truth value is quickly decidable on other than purely linguistic grounds, a set of A-true formulae, and a set of rules for the confirmation and disconfirmation of non-L-true, non-A-true formulae which are not quickly decidable. Criteria which acceptable sets of A-true formulae must fulfill are given. Using this apparatus, a schema for a realistic interpretation of scientific theories is outlined.
Philosophy of Science © 1962 The University of Chicago Press