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What Economics Is Not: An Economist's Response to Rosenberg
Douglas W. Hands
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 51, No. 3 (Sep., 1984), pp. 495-503
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/187496
Page Count: 9
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Alexander Rosenberg (1983) has argued, contrary to his previous work in the philosophy of economics, that economics is not science, and it is merely mathematics. The following paper argues that Rosenberg fails to demonstrate either of these two claims. The questions of the predictive weakness of modern economics and the cognitive standing of abstract economic theory are discussed in detail.
Philosophy of Science © 1984 The University of Chicago Press