If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support

What Economics Is Not: An Economist's Response to Rosenberg

Douglas W. Hands
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 51, No. 3 (Sep., 1984), pp. 495-503
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/187496
Page Count: 9
  • Download PDF
  • Cite this Item

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support
What Economics Is Not: An Economist's Response to Rosenberg
Preview not available

Abstract

Alexander Rosenberg (1983) has argued, contrary to his previous work in the philosophy of economics, that economics is not science, and it is merely mathematics. The following paper argues that Rosenberg fails to demonstrate either of these two claims. The questions of the predictive weakness of modern economics and the cognitive standing of abstract economic theory are discussed in detail.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
495
    495
  • Thumbnail: Page 
496
    496
  • Thumbnail: Page 
497
    497
  • Thumbnail: Page 
498
    498
  • Thumbnail: Page 
499
    499
  • Thumbnail: Page 
500
    500
  • Thumbnail: Page 
501
    501
  • Thumbnail: Page 
502
    502
  • Thumbnail: Page 
503
    503