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Parsimony, Likelihood, and the Principle of the Common Cause
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 54, No. 3 (Sep., 1987), pp. 465-469
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/187585
Page Count: 5
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The likelihood justification of cladistic parsimony suggested in Sober (1984) is here shown to be incomplete. Even so, cladistic parsimony remains a counter-example to the principle of the common cause formulated by Reichenbach (1956) and Salmon (1975, 1979, 1984).
Philosophy of Science © 1987 The University of Chicago Press