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The Paradox of the Preface
John L. Pollock
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 53, No. 2 (Jun., 1986), pp. 246-258
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/187694
Page Count: 13
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In a number of recent papers I have been developing the theory of "nomic probability," which is supposed to be the kind of probability involved in statistical laws of nature. One of the main principles of this theory is an acceptance rule explicitly designed to handle the lottery paradox. This paper shows that the rule can also handle the paradox of the preface. The solution proceeds in part by pointing out a surprising connection between the paradox of the preface and the gambler's fallacy.
Philosophy of Science © 1986 The University of Chicago Press