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When Probabilistic Support Is Inductive
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 57, No. 2 (Jun., 1990), pp. 278-289
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/187836
Page Count: 12
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Atoms, Algebra, Truth, Philosophy of science, Logical relationships, Boolean algebras, Logical impossibility, Information relevance, Empirical evidence, Sun
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This note makes a contribution to the issue raised in a paper by Popper and Miller (1983) in which it was claimed that probabilistic support is purely deductive. Developing R. C. Jeffrey's remarks, a new general approach to the crucial concept of "going beyond" is here proposed. By means of it a quantitative measure of the inductive component of a probabilistic inference is reached. This proposal leads to vindicating the view that typical predictive probabilistic inferences by enumeration and analogy are purely inductive.
Philosophy of Science © 1990 The University of Chicago Press