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Glymour on Evidential Relevance
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 50, No. 3 (Sep., 1983), pp. 471-481
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/187860
Page Count: 11
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Glymour's "bootstrap" account of confirmation is designed to provide an analysis of evidential relevance, which has been a serious problem for hypothetico-deductivism. As set out in Theory and Evidence, however, the "bootstrap" condition allows confirmation in clear cases of evidential irrelevance. The difficulties with Glymour's account seem to be due to a basic feature which it shares with hypothetico-deductive accounts, and which may explain why neither can give a satisfactory analysis of evidential relevance.
Philosophy of Science © 1983 The University of Chicago Press