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A Reply to Churchland's "Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality"
Jerry A. Fodor
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 55, No. 2 (Jun., 1988), pp. 188-198
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/187957
Page Count: 11
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Churchland's paper "Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality" offers empirical, semantical and epistemological arguments intended to show that the cognitive impenetrability of perception "does not establish a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge" and that the psychological account of perceptual encapsulation that I set forth in The Modularity of Mind "[is] almost certainly false". The present paper considers these arguments in detail and dismisses them.
Philosophy of Science © 1988 The University of Chicago Press