Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support

Confirmational Holism and Bayesian Epistemology

David Christensen
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 59, No. 4 (Dec., 1992), pp. 540-557
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/188129
Page Count: 18
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Download ($14.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support
Confirmational Holism and Bayesian Epistemology
Preview not available

Abstract

Much contemporary epistemology is informed by a kind of confirmational holism, and a consequent rejection of the assumption that all confirmation rests on experiential certainties. Another prominent theme is that belief comes in degrees, and that rationality requires apportioning one's degrees of belief reasonably. Bayesian confirmation models based on Jeffrey Conditionalization attempt to bring together these two appealing strands. I argue, however, that these models cannot account for a certain aspect of confirmation that would be accounted for in any adequate holistic confirmation theory. I then survey the prospects for constructing a formal epistemology that better accommodates holistic insights.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
540
    540
  • Thumbnail: Page 
541
    541
  • Thumbnail: Page 
542
    542
  • Thumbnail: Page 
543
    543
  • Thumbnail: Page 
544
    544
  • Thumbnail: Page 
545
    545
  • Thumbnail: Page 
546
    546
  • Thumbnail: Page 
547
    547
  • Thumbnail: Page 
548
    548
  • Thumbnail: Page 
549
    549
  • Thumbnail: Page 
550
    550
  • Thumbnail: Page 
551
    551
  • Thumbnail: Page 
552
    552
  • Thumbnail: Page 
553
    553
  • Thumbnail: Page 
554
    554
  • Thumbnail: Page 
555
    555
  • Thumbnail: Page 
556
    556
  • Thumbnail: Page 
557
    557