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Darwin's Argument in the Origin

M. J. S. Hodge
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 59, No. 3 (Sep., 1992), pp. 461-464
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/188160
Page Count: 4
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Darwin's Argument in the Origin
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Abstract

Various claims have been made, recently, that Darwin's argumentation in the Origin instantiates and so supports some general philosophical proposal about scientific theorizing, for example, the "semantic view". But these claims are grounded in various incorrect analyses of that argumentation. A summary is given here of an analysis defended at greater length in several papers by the present author. The historical and philosophical advantages of this analysis are explained briefly. Darwin's argument comprises three distinct evidential cases on behalf of natural selection, cases, that is, for its existence, its adequacy and its responsibility. Theorizing, today, about evolution by natural selection involves a similar structure of evidential and explanatory concerns.

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