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Pluralism, Logical Empiricism, and the Problem of Pseudoscience

George A. Reisch
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 65, No. 2 (Jun., 1998), pp. 333-348
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/188264
Page Count: 16
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Pluralism, Logical Empiricism, and the Problem of Pseudoscience
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Abstract

I criticize conceptual pluralism, as endorsed recently by John Dupre and Philip Kitcher, for failing to supply strategies for demarcating science from non-science. Using creation-science as a test case, I argue that pluralism blocks arguments that keep creation-science in check and that metaphysical pluralism offers it positive, metaphysical support. Logical empiricism, however, still provides useful resources to reconfigure and manage the problem of creation-science in those practical and political contexts where pluralism will fail.

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