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Lewis, Thau, and Hall on Chance and the Best-System Account of Law
John F. Halpin
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 65, No. 2 (Jun., 1998), pp. 349-360
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/188265
Page Count: 12
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This article considers the recent work of David Lewis, Ned Hall, and Michael Thau on chance and the best system account of law. My rejoinder suggests that, though their proposals may succeed at the stated goal of reworking the problematic relationship between chance, credence, and law, the resulting account of law suffers from an even more significant difficulty. To oversimplify a bit, I argue that their account is unable to handle the nomic necessity of laws. My criticisms suggest an alternative account of law which provides, I argue, a preferable account of nomic necessity.
Philosophy of Science © 1998 The University of Chicago Press