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Error Statistics and Learning from Error: Making a Virtue of Necessity

Deborah G. Mayo
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 64, Supplement. Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers (Dec., 1997), pp. S195-S212
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/188403
Page Count: 18
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Error Statistics and Learning from Error: Making a Virtue of Necessity
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Abstract

The error statistical account of testing uses statistical considerations, not to provide a measure of probability of hypotheses, but to model patterns of irregularity that are useful for controlling, distinguishing, and learning from errors. The aim of this paper is (1) to explain the main points of contrast between the error statistical and the subjective Bayesian approach and (2) to elucidate the key errors that underlie the central objection raised by Colin Howson at our PSA 96 Symposium.

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