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Can Physicalist Antireductionism Compute the Embryo?

Alex Rosenberg
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 64, Supplement. Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers (Dec., 1997), pp. S359-S371
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/188417
Page Count: 13
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Can Physicalist Antireductionism Compute the Embryo?
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Abstract

It is widely held that (1) there are autonomous levels of organization above that of the macromolecule and that (2) at least sometimes macromolecular processes are best explained in terms of such autonomous kinds. I argue that molecular developmental biology honors neither of these claims, and I show that the only way they can be rendered consistent with a minimal physicalism is through the adoption of controversial claims about causation and explanation which undercut the force of these two antireductionism claims.

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