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On the Observational Equivalence of Managerial Contracts Under Conditions of Moral Hazard and Self-Selection

Kathleen M. Hagerty and Daniel R. Siegel
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol. 103, No. 2 (May, 1988), pp. 425-428
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1885123
Page Count: 4
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On the Observational Equivalence of Managerial Contracts Under Conditions of Moral Hazard and Self-Selection
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