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Completeness and Indeterministic Causation

Scott DeVito
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 63, Supplement. Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers (Sep., 1996), pp. S177-S184
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/188525
Page Count: 8
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Completeness and Indeterministic Causation
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Abstract

In The Chances of Explanation, Paul Humphreys presents a metaphysical analysis of causation. In this paper, I argue that this analysis is flawed. Humphreys' model of Causality incorporates three completeness requirements. I show that these completeness requirements, when applied in the world, force us to take causally irrelevant factors to be causally relevant. On this basis, I argue that Humphreys' analysis should be rejected.

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