Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support

Shedding Light on Time

Craig Callender
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 67, Supplement. Proceedings of the 1998 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers (Sep., 2000), pp. S587-S599
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/188697
Page Count: 13
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Download ($14.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support
Shedding Light on Time
Preview not available

Abstract

Throughout this century many philosophers and physicists have gone for the 'big kill' regarding tenses. They have tried to show via McTaggart's paradox and special relativity that tenses are logically and physically impossible, respectively. Neither attempt succeeds, though as I argue, both leave their mark. In the first two sections of the paper I introduce some conceptual difficulties for the tensed theory of time. The next section then discusses the standing of tenses in light of special relativity, especially recent work by Stein on the topic. I argue that, Stein's possibility theorem notwithstanding, special relativity is inconsistent with any philosophically interesting conception of tense. Finally, I search for help for tenses in the broader context of quantum theory, Lorentzian interpretations of time dilation/length contraction, and general relativistic spacetimes. I suggest that these avenues do not provide tenses the home for which some have hoped.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
S587
    S587
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S588
    S588
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S589
    S589
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S590
    S590
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S591
    S591
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S592
    S592
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S593
    S593
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S594
    S594
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S595
    S595
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S596
    S596
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S597
    S597
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S598
    S598
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S599
    S599