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Some Problems for "Alternative Individualism"
R. A. Wilson
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 67, No. 4 (Dec., 2000), pp. 671-679
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/188712
Page Count: 9
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This paper points to some problems for the position that D.M. Walsh calls "alternative individualism," and argues that in defending this view Walsh has omitted an important part of what separates individualists and externalists in psychology. Walsh's example of Hox gene complexes is discussed in detail to show why some sort of externalism about scientific taxonomy more generally is a more plausible view than any extant version of individualism.
Philosophy of Science © 2000 The University of Chicago Press