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Van Fraassen's Dissolution of Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 66, No. 1 (Mar., 1999), pp. 158-164
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/188742
Page Count: 7
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Bas van Fraassen has recently argued for a "dissolution" of Hilary Putnam's well-known model-theoretic argument. In this paper I argue that, as it stands, van Fraassen's reply to Putnam is unsuccessful. Nonetheless, it suggests the form a successful response might take.
Philosophy of Science © 1999 The University of Chicago Press