Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support

Van Fraassen's Dissolution of Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument

Mathias Frisch
Philosophy of Science
Vol. 66, No. 1 (Mar., 1999), pp. 158-164
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/188742
Page Count: 7
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Download ($14.00)
  • Cite this Item
If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support
Van Fraassen's Dissolution of Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument
Preview not available

Abstract

Bas van Fraassen has recently argued for a "dissolution" of Hilary Putnam's well-known model-theoretic argument. In this paper I argue that, as it stands, van Fraassen's reply to Putnam is unsuccessful. Nonetheless, it suggests the form a successful response might take.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
158
    158
  • Thumbnail: Page 
159
    159
  • Thumbnail: Page 
160
    160
  • Thumbnail: Page 
161
    161
  • Thumbnail: Page 
162
    162
  • Thumbnail: Page 
163
    163
  • Thumbnail: Page 
164
    164