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The Bargaining Problem
John F. Nash, Jr.
Vol. 18, No. 2 (Apr., 1950), pp. 155-162
Published by: The Econometric Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1907266
Page Count: 8
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A new treatment is presented of a classical economic problem, one which occurs in many forms, as bargaining, bilateral monopoly, etc. It may also be regarded as a nonzero-sum two-person game. In this treatment a few general assumptions are made concerning the behavior of a single individual and of a group of two individuals in certain economic environments. From these, the solution (in the sense of this paper) of the classical problem may be obtained. In the terms of game theory, values are found for the game.
Econometrica © 1950 The Econometric Society