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Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
Jerry Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont
Vol. 45, No. 2 (Mar., 1977), pp. 427-438
Published by: The Econometric Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1911219
Page Count: 12
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Social decision mechanisms that admit dominant strategies and result in Pareto optima are characterized by the class of mechanisms proposed by Groves. The concept of decision mechanisms is generalized and the characterization is shown to extend to these cases.
Econometrica © 1977 The Econometric Society