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Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods

Jerry Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont
Econometrica
Vol. 45, No. 2 (Mar., 1977), pp. 427-438
Published by: The Econometric Society
DOI: 10.2307/1911219
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1911219
Page Count: 12
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Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
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Abstract

Social decision mechanisms that admit dominant strategies and result in Pareto optima are characterized by the class of mechanisms proposed by Groves. The concept of decision mechanisms is generalized and the characterization is shown to extend to these cases.

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