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Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent

Jacques Crémer and Richard P. McLean
Econometrica
Vol. 53, No. 2 (Mar., 1985), pp. 345-361
Published by: The Econometric Society
DOI: 10.2307/1911240
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1911240
Page Count: 17
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Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
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Abstract

This paper deals with the optimal design of resource allocation mechanisms in the presence of asymmetric information. A buyer's valuation function is allowed to depend on the characteristics of other buyers as well as his own and sufficient conditions are provided under which the seller can extract the full surplus from the buyers in an "ex post Nash" equilibrium. The result is then applied to the important problem of optimal auction design.

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