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Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
Edward J. Green and Robert H. Porter
Vol. 52, No. 1 (Jan., 1984), pp. 87-100
Published by: The Econometric Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1911462
Page Count: 14
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Recent work in game theory has shown that, in principle, it may be possible for firms in an industry to form a self-policing cartel to maximize their joint profits. This paper examines the nature of cartel self-enforcement in the presence of demand uncertainty. A model of a noncooperatively supported cartel is presented, and the aspects of industry structure which would make such a cartel viable are discussed.
Econometrica © 1984 The Econometric Society