Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.

The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study

Alvin E. Roth and J. Keith Murnighan
Econometrica
Vol. 50, No. 5 (Sep., 1982), pp. 1123-1142
Published by: The Econometric Society
DOI: 10.2307/1911866
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1911866
Page Count: 20
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Download ($10.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study
Preview not available

Abstract

A fundamental assumption in much of game theory and economics is that all the relevant information for determining the rational play of a game is contained in its structural description. Recent experimental studies of bargaining have demonstrated effects due to information not included in the classical models of games of complete information. The goal of the experiment reported here is to separate these effects into components that can be attributed to the possession of specific information by specific bargainers, and to assess the extent to which the observed behavior can be characterized as equilibrium behavior. The results of the experiment permit us to identify such component effects, in equilibrium, including effects that depend on whether certain information is common knowledge or not. The paper closes with some speculation on the causes of these effects.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
1123
    1123
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1124
    1124
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1125
    1125
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1126
    1126
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1127
    1127
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1128
    1128
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1129
    1129
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1130
    1130
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1131
    1131
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1132
    1132
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1133
    1133
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1134
    1134
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1135
    1135
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1136
    1136
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1137
    1137
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1138
    1138
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1139
    1139
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1140
    1140
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1141
    1141
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1142
    1142