Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.

Efficient, Anonymous, and Neutral Group Decision Procedures

Walter Armbruster and Werner Boge
Econometrica
Vol. 51, No. 5 (Sep., 1983), pp. 1389-1405
Published by: The Econometric Society
DOI: 10.2307/1912280
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1912280
Page Count: 17
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Download ($10.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Efficient, Anonymous, and Neutral Group Decision Procedures
Preview not available

Abstract

The well known result that every finite, strictly deterministic game with perfect information has a unique solution unless the utility functions of the players lie in a low dimensional exception space, is generalized to games containing change moves. Two group decision procedures, "voting by successive proposal and veto" and "voting by repeated veto," are analyzed in this context. The first procedure is efficient, anonymous, and neutral for an arbitrary number n of participants and an arbitrary finite set of alternatives, the second only if n @? 3.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
1389
    1389
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1390
    1390
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1391
    1391
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1392
    1392
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1393
    1393
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1394
    1394
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1395
    1395
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1396
    1396
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1397
    1397
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1398
    1398
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1399
    1399
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1400
    1400
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1401
    1401
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1402
    1402
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1403
    1403
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1404
    1404
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1405
    1405