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Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
Paul Milgrom and John Roberts
Vol. 50, No. 2 (Mar., 1982), pp. 443-459
Published by: The Econometric Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1912637
Page Count: 17
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Pricing, Prices, Cost of entry, Monopoly, Pricing strategies, Games, Market prices, Profitable firms, Signals, Capital costs
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Limit pricing involves charging prices below the monopoly price to make new entry appear unattractive. If the entrant is a rational decision maker with complete information, pre-entry prices will not influence its entry decision, so the established firm has no incentive to practice limit pricing. However, if the established firm has private, payoff relevant information (e.g., about costs), then prices can signal that information, so limit pricing can arise in equilibrium. The probability that entry actually occurs in such an equilibrium, however, can be lower, the same, or even higher than in a regime of complete information (where no limit pricing would occur).
Econometrica © 1982 The Econometric Society