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The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets

Gabrielle Demange and David Gale
Econometrica
Vol. 53, No. 4 (Jul., 1985), pp. 873-888
Published by: The Econometric Society
DOI: 10.2307/1912658
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1912658
Page Count: 16
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Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
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Abstract

We study two-sided markets in which agents are buyers and sellers or firms and workers or men and women. The agents are to form partnerships (which provide them with satisfaction) and at the same time make monetary transfers (e.g. salaries or dowries). The core of this market game is shown to have a particularly nice structure so that precise answers can be given to questions concerning comparative statics and manipulability.

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