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The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
Gabrielle Demange and David Gale
Vol. 53, No. 4 (Jul., 1985), pp. 873-888
Published by: The Econometric Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1912658
Page Count: 16
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We study two-sided markets in which agents are buyers and sellers or firms and workers or men and women. The agents are to form partnerships (which provide them with satisfaction) and at the same time make monetary transfers (e.g. salaries or dowries). The core of this market game is shown to have a particularly nice structure so that precise answers can be given to questions concerning comparative statics and manipulability.
Econometrica © 1985 The Econometric Society