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On Preferences, Beliefs, and Manipulation within Voting Situations
Jean-Marie Blin and Mark A. Satterthwaite
Vol. 45, No. 4 (May, 1977), pp. 881-888
Published by: The Econometric Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1912678
Page Count: 8
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This paper shows that no nondictatorial voting procedure exists that induces each voter to choose his voting strategy solely on the basis of his preferences and independently of his beliefs concerning other voters' preferences. This necessary dependence between a voter's beliefs and his choice of strategy means that a voter can manipulate another voter's choice of strategy by misleading him into adopting inaccurate beliefs concerning other voters' beliefs.
Econometrica © 1977 The Econometric Society