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The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance

Salvador Barberá
Econometrica
Vol. 45, No. 7 (Oct., 1977), pp. 1573-1588
Published by: The Econometric Society
DOI: 10.2307/1913950
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1913950
Page Count: 16
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The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
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Abstract

In this paper we study the possibility of constructing satisfactory social choice mechanisms whose outcomes are determined by a combination of voting and chance. The following theorem is obtained: if a social choice mechanism does not leave "too much" to chance and satisfies a unanimity condition, then it is either uniformly manipulable or dictatorial. The result contributes to the program suggested by Gibbard [2] for the study of the extent to which social choice mechanisms in which chance plays a role can be freed from strategic manipulation.

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