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The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
Vol. 45, No. 7 (Oct., 1977), pp. 1573-1588
Published by: The Econometric Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1913950
Page Count: 16
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In this paper we study the possibility of constructing satisfactory social choice mechanisms whose outcomes are determined by a combination of voting and chance. The following theorem is obtained: if a social choice mechanism does not leave "too much" to chance and satisfies a unanimity condition, then it is either uniformly manipulable or dictatorial. The result contributes to the program suggested by Gibbard  for the study of the extent to which social choice mechanisms in which chance plays a role can be freed from strategic manipulation.
Econometrica © 1977 The Econometric Society