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Summation Social Choice Functions
Peter C. Fishburn
Vol. 41, No. 6 (Nov., 1973), pp. 1183-1196
Published by: The Econometric Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1914044
Page Count: 14
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A summation social choice function is a social choice function whose choice sets are determinable from maximum sums of utilities that preserve individual preference. Assuming the set of alternatives is finite and individual preferences are irreflexive and transitive, a unanimity-type condition is shown to be necessary and sufficient for a social choice function to be a summation social choice function. The effects of conditions of voter independence, anonymity, and neutrality are noted.
Econometrica © 1973 The Econometric Society