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Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
Ehud Kalai and Meir Smorodinsky
Vol. 43, No. 3 (May, 1975), pp. 513-518
Published by: The Econometric Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1914280
Page Count: 6
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A two-person bargaining problem is considered. It is shown that under four axioms that describe the behavior of players there is a unique solution to such a problem. The axioms and the solution presented are different from those suggested by Nash. Also, families of solutions which satisfy a more limited set of axioms and which are continuous are discussed.
Econometrica © 1975 The Econometric Society