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Beyond Inference in Perception
Stephen P. Stich
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
Vol. 1982, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers (1982), pp. 553-560
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192443
Page Count: 8
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The controversy over inference in perception turns on the nature of the processes that intervene between the stimulus and the perceptual experience or percept. Should the processes be viewed as something like inference and computation, or should they be viewed as psychologically primitive mechanisms whose workings are best accounted for at a neurological or physiological level? It is argued that the view that computational and inference-like processes play a role in perceptual processes should be adopted.
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association © 1982 The University of Chicago Press