Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support

Beyond Inference in Perception

Stephen P. Stich
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
Vol. 1982, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers (1982), pp. 553-560
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192443
Page Count: 8
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Download ($14.00)
  • Cite this Item
If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support
Beyond Inference in Perception
Preview not available

Abstract

The controversy over inference in perception turns on the nature of the processes that intervene between the stimulus and the perceptual experience or percept. Should the processes be viewed as something like inference and computation, or should they be viewed as psychologically primitive mechanisms whose workings are best accounted for at a neurological or physiological level? It is argued that the view that computational and inference-like processes play a role in perceptual processes should be adopted.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[553]
    [553]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
554
    554
  • Thumbnail: Page 
555
    555
  • Thumbnail: Page 
556
    556
  • Thumbnail: Page 
557
    557
  • Thumbnail: Page 
558
    558
  • Thumbnail: Page 
559
    559
  • Thumbnail: Page 
560
    560