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Quantitative Probabilistic Causality and Structural Scientific Realism
Paul W. Humphreys
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
Vol. 1984, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers (1984), pp. 329-342
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192512
Page Count: 14
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The elements of structural models used in the social sciences are built up from four fundamental assumptions. It is then shown how the central idea of qualitative probabilistic causality follows as a special case of this covariational account. The relationships of both instrumentalism and common cause arguments for scientific realism to these structures is demonstrated. It is concluded that a predictivist argument against a thoroughgoing instrumentalism can be given, and hence why the difference between experimental and non-experimental contexts is important to arguments for scientific realism.
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association © 1984 The University of Chicago Press