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Subjective Qualia from a Materialist Point of View

Paul M. Churchland
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
Vol. 1984, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers (1984), pp. 773-790
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192538
Page Count: 18
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Subjective Qualia from a Materialist Point of View
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Abstract

The aim of the paper is to defeat some standard anti-reductionist arguments concerning sensory qualia. Initially conditions on intertheoretic reduction in general are established. The standard arguments are then shown to presuppose a false conception of what reduction requires; or to commit a familiar intensional fallacy; or to be unsound; or to equivocate on crucial terms. An exploration of our making direct introspective contact with our neurophysiological states concludes the paper.

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