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Levels of Reflexivity: Unnoted Differences within the "Strong Programme" in the Sociology of Knowledge
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
Vol. 1980, Volume One: Contributed Papers (1980), pp. 197-207
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192565
Page Count: 11
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Social reflexivity, History of science, Evolution, Social theories, Scientific belief, Philosophy of science, Social events, Explanation theories, Social epistemology, Newtonianism
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A basic question confronting programs in the sociology of science is: "Can the thesis that cognitive claims are socially determined be interpreted in a way that preserves the credibility of the sociology of science, when that thesis is reflexively applied to the sociology of science?" That question is approached here by means of a critical comparison of two versions of the "strong programme" in the sociology of knowledge. The key difference is the effort in one of the two versions (B. Barnes') to develop a context within which to articulate the distinction of science and ideology.
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association © 1980 The University of Chicago Press