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The International Negotiation Game: Some Evidence from the Tokyo Round
Kenneth S. Chan
The Review of Economics and Statistics
Vol. 67, No. 3 (Aug., 1985), pp. 456-464
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1925974
Page Count: 9
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This paper examines the Tokyo Round negotiation (1973-1979) under various cooperative game solution concepts. Out of the many tariff-cutting proposals in the Tokyo Round, the Swiss proposal was finally agreed upon by all major players. The choice of the Swiss proposal suggested that egalitarian considerations are important for this type of cooperative game. Since the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, the Shapley value (modified) and the nucleolus solution have this egalitarian property, they all predict the outcome of the negotiation very well.
The Review of Economics and Statistics © 1985 The MIT Press