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On Values in Science: Is the Epistemic/Non-Epistemic Distinction Useful?

Phyllis Rooney
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
Vol. 1992, Volume One: Contributed Papers (1992), pp. 13-22
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192740
Page Count: 10
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On Values in Science: Is the Epistemic/Non-Epistemic Distinction Useful?
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Abstract

The debate about the rational and the social in science has sometimes been developed in the context of a distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values. Paying particular attention to two important discussion in the last decade, by Longino and by McMullin, I argue that a fuller understanding of values in science ultimately requires abandoning the distinction itself. This is argued directly in terms of an analysis of the lack of clarity concerning what epistemic values are. I also argue that the philosophical import of much of the feminist work in philosophy of science is restricted by any kind of strict adherence to the distinction.

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