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Cartwright, Capacities, and Probabilities
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
Vol. 1992, Volume One: Contributed Papers (1992), pp. 239-250
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192758
Page Count: 12
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I argue that Nancy Cartwright's largely methodological arguments for capacities and against Hume's regularity account of causation are only partially successful. They are especially problematic in establishing the primacy of singular causation and the reality of mixed-dual capacities. Therefore, her arguments need to be supported by ontological ones, and I propose the propensity interpretation of causal probabilities as a natural way of doing this.
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association © 1992 The University of Chicago Press