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Theory-Ladenness of Observations as a Test Case of Kuhn's Approach to Scientific Inquiry
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
Vol. 1992, Volume One: Contributed Papers (1992), pp. 277-286
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192761
Page Count: 10
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Interrogatives, Incommensurability of scientific theories, Observational terms, Argumentation, Scientific observation, Philosophy of science, Inference, Identifiability, Philosophical analysis, Scientific revolution
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Kuhn's contribution should be viewed as posing a number of important problems, not as a full-fledged theory of the structure of science. Kuhn's alleged theory-ladenness of observations is examined as a test case in the light of Hintikka's interrogative model of inquiry. A certain superficial theory-ladenness is built into that model. Moreover, the model provides a deeper analysis of theory-ladenness via the two-levelled character of experimental science. A higher-level and a lower-level inquiry rely on different kinds of initial premises and operate with different kinds of "answers" by nature. The model also throws light on the alleged theory-ladenness of meaning.
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association © 1992 The University of Chicago Press