If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support

Cognitive Models in the Philosophy of Science

Ronald N. Giere
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
Vol. 1986, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers (1986), pp. 319-328
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192810
Page Count: 10
  • Download PDF
  • Cite this Item

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support
Cognitive Models in the Philosophy of Science
Preview not available

Abstract

This paper provides a general defense of the idea that the cognitive sciences provide models that are useful for exploring issues that have traditionally occupied philosophers of science. Questions about the nature of theories, for example, are assimilated into studies of the nature of cognitive representations, while questions concerning the choice of theories fall under studies of human judgment and decision making. The implications of adopting "a cognitive approach" are explored, particularly the rejection of foundationist epistemologies which might provide a philosophical justification of science. Instead I suggest a scientific foundation provided by evolutionary biology and the scientific goal of explaining science as a human phenomenon.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[319]
    [319]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
320
    320
  • Thumbnail: Page 
321
    321
  • Thumbnail: Page 
322
    322
  • Thumbnail: Page 
323
    323
  • Thumbnail: Page 
324
    324
  • Thumbnail: Page 
325
    325
  • Thumbnail: Page 
326
    326
  • Thumbnail: Page 
327
    327
  • Thumbnail: Page 
328
    328