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Cognitive Models in the Philosophy of Science
Ronald N. Giere
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
Vol. 1986, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers (1986), pp. 319-328
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192810
Page Count: 10
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This paper provides a general defense of the idea that the cognitive sciences provide models that are useful for exploring issues that have traditionally occupied philosophers of science. Questions about the nature of theories, for example, are assimilated into studies of the nature of cognitive representations, while questions concerning the choice of theories fall under studies of human judgment and decision making. The implications of adopting "a cognitive approach" are explored, particularly the rejection of foundationist epistemologies which might provide a philosophical justification of science. Instead I suggest a scientific foundation provided by evolutionary biology and the scientific goal of explaining science as a human phenomenon.
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association © 1986 The University of Chicago Press